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FACTS

Colmo, S.A. is a private sector company located in the Republic
of El Paraiso.
Colmo, S.A. manufactures household appliances. Approximately
60% of Colmo's revenues are derived from sales within El Paraiso;
the balance comes from exports to the United States and Europe.
Colmo does business overseas principally through its two whollyowned subsidiaries, Colmo America, Inc. (a New York company) and
Colmo U.K. Limited (a U.K. company).
The outstanding indebtedness of the Colmo Group (compromising the parent company and its two subsidiaries) consists of the
following:
(i) large floating-rate borrowings by Colmo, S.A. in the local capital
markets in El Paraiso (equal to about U.S.$100 million equivalent),
some of which are secured by mortgages on the company's plant and
equipment;
(ii) an unsecured $25 million revolving (syndicated) loan facility arranged by Bigbank, N.A. (a U.S. bank) for Colmo America. This facility, which is governed by the law of the State of New York, benefits from
a full guarantee issued by the parent, Colmo, S.A.; and
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(iii) a £50 million Eurobond issue by Colmo U.K., listed on the London
Exchange. These bonds are governed by the law of England. They are
unsecured but carry a full guarantee of the parent, Colmo, S.A.
As a result of a prolonged current account deficit, El Paraiso has
been forced to devalue its currency by 50% and domestic interest
rates have risen to 70% per annum. This situation has rendered it
unlikely that Colmo will be able to meet its foreign currency debt obligations for the balance of this year. The company's chief financial
officer, with laudable candor, issued the following statement to the
domestic news media:
Naturally, in light of El Paraiso's unexpected currency devaluation, the
Colmo Group companies will not be in a position to pay their external
debt obligations falling due for the balance of this year, at least. But
everyone knows that this circumstance is an Act of God, and Act of
State and a condition of flagrant force majeure for which the Colmo
Group is not legally or morally responsible.
DISCUSSION
Pre-Default Strategy
Question 1: (To Mr. David Barnard)
Each of the £50 million Eurobond issued by Colno U.K. and the
$25 million revolving loan facility for Colmo America contain a "material adverse change" event of default. Under this clause, an event of
default may be declared if 25% of the bondholders (in the case of the
Eurobond) or 50% of the banks (by exposure, in the case of the syndicated loan agreement) determine that either the borrower or the guarantor (Colmo, S.A.) has experienced "a material adverse change in its
financial condition."
Mr. Barnard, what legal or tactical considerations would be relevant in counseling a group of the Colmo U.K. bondholders in this
situation?
Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
To marshal (or even to locate) 25% of the bondholders in order
to declare the requisite event of default may prove difficult, particularly where the issue took the form of a straight sale of paper to a wide
and disparate class of investors. This position can be contrasted with a
co-ordinated placement of notes to a limited (and easily identified)
market in which case the problem may not arise.
On the assumption that the "material adverse change" determination can be made, however, (and that the determination does entitle
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acceleration of fights under the bonds) the bondholders must assess
whether their interests are in fact served by acceleration. The consequences of acceleration must be balanced against the likely consequences of doing nothing [or seeking a less antagonistic resolution discussion of work-out?].
A number of questions arise. How easily will it be to sue and
obtain judgment against the issuer and guarantor? What are the prospects of then successfully enforcing a judgment obtained in any relevant jurisdiction? Will a technical win result in an actual recovery?
Will affirmative action now trigger cross-default clauses in other loan
documentation? If so, the bondholders may find that they are the first
to "press the button" but end up the last in line in the ensuing fight for
assets.
If the decision is to accelerate and to then to sue, the relevant
English court procedure may differ as between the UK issuer and the
foreign guarantor.
Commencing proceedings (by service of a writ and statement of
claim) against Colmo UK should be relatively straightforward. Assuming that the company then gives notice that it will defend the
claim, the bondholders are likely to be advised to apply to the English
court for "summary judgment." Where successful, this application
(made on affidavit evidence only and based upon the premise that the
defendant has no defense to the claim) provides a speedy mechanism
for obtaining judgment without proceeding to trial. The risk with this
otherwise attractive procedure (as you would expect given the potential prejudice to a defendant with legitimate defenses) is that the application is relatively easy to defeat. All the defendant need do is
establish that there is some issue in dispute that ought to be tried (or
some other reason for trial) and in all likelihood a trial will be ordered. An unequivocal and immediately persuasive event of default
upon which the bondholders can rely is therefore to be preferred.
As to the El Parasian guarantor the first question is where to sue.
Do the bondholders attempt to sue in England and enforce in El
Paraiso? Alternatively, do they sue in El Paraiso (with the difficulties
inherent in asking the foreign court to interpret an English law document) and enforce in England? If so against what? The procedures
and likely risks with each course will have to be assessed.
If the choice is to proceed in England, and Colmo S.A. has no
agent for service there and denies the jurisdiction of the English court,
the bondholders have a further problem. They will need to resort to
provisions of English procedure permitting, in certain circumstances,
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service of proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction (i.e., in El
Paraiso). This will inevitably complicate and prolong the process described above.
The arguments against "pressing the button," while other opportunites to recover the debt remain unexplored, are persuasive.
Post-Default Strategy
Question 2: (To the Panel)
Should the bank lenders to Colno America now be running to
the courthouse? If so, which courthouse?
Answer: (Mr. Thomas Heather)
Colmo America, Inc. creditors shall begin an action before the
U.S. courts, against Colmo America, Inc., in order to secure any assets
or properties located in the U.S. owned by Colmo America, Inc. In
addition, under the terms of the respective loan agreements and guarantees, Colmo America, Inc. creditors may demand compliance of the
guarantee granted by Colmo, S.A. before a U.S. court.
Nevertheless, enforcement of a valid final award granted against
Colmo, S.A. by a foreign court will be subject to any prior proceedings
against Colmo, S.A. in Mexico, and to the rules for the enforcement of
final awards contemplated under Mexican law.
Answer: (Ambassador Emilio J. Cardenas)
The loan was made to Colmo, S.A.'s American subsidiary (Colmo
America, Inc.) and is governed by the Law of the State of New York.
One can assume that monies under it were disbursed and are to be
paid in New York and that both the debtor and the guarantor have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of
New York.
It can also be assumed that there are assets of both the debtor
and guarantor in the jurisdiction of New York, justifying an action
therein.
Lenders should try to collect in the New York courts. Debtor and
guarantor should be served notice "in personam" of the respective
court actions.
In the event of non-payment or insufficiency of assets in New
York, should bankrupcy proceedings start in New York, against
Colmo, S.A., as guarantor, it must always be kept in mind that such
action is - under Argentine law - a valid cause for the commencement
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of similar procedures in Argentina, at the request of the debtor himself or of a creditor whose credit against the guarantor must be paid in
Argentina.
As a rule, a foreign bankrupcy procedure cannot be invoked
against creditors whose credits must be paid in Argentina neither to
dispute fights claimed by them over assets existing within its territory
nor to annul transactions entered into by them with the creditor.
Should the bankrupcy be adjudicated in Argentina, creditors
from the foreign procedures shall proceed on the "balance" remaining
after the other creditors verified in the bankruptcy have been
satisfied.
The verification of a creditor whose credit is payable abroad (like
Bigbank, N.A.) and who does not belong to a foreign bankruptcy procedure is conditioned upon the prior showing of evidence that, on a
reciprocity basis, a creditor whose credit is payable in Argentina may
verify and recover - in similar terms - its credit in a bankrupcy proce-

dure instituted in the country where such credit is payable.
Collection of ordinary claims in a foreign country made after the
local bankruptcy procedure is commenced will be applied to the dividend which may belong to the beneficiary of such collection on account of ordinary claims.
Secured creditors (like those holding mortgages over Coimo,
S.A.'s plant and equipment) are given priority in Argentina over common - unsecured - creditors.

Question 3: (To Mr. Barnard)
What should the Colmo U.K. bondholders be thinking (assuming
the presence of a cross-default clause in the bonds)?
Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
We should preface any remarks with the observation that the liquidity or even solvency problems of a parent company (and guarantor) do not of themselves mean that a subsidiary will be unable to
meet the payments due on its obligations. It may be, and remain, a
solvent subsidiary of an insolvent parent.
Again the bondholders must assess the merits of "waiting and
seeing" as against the consequences of affirmative action and triggering cross-defaults in other loan documentation. Precipitate action
(even though legitimate) by the bondholders might ultimately prove
counter-productive to their interests.
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As compared to the position under question 1, relying upon a
cross-default when seeking summary judgment is likely to be more
attractive than a subjective bondholders' "determination." It will not,
however, be entirely impenetrable to challenge, requiring for example
a clear demonstration of the initial default (and therefore creating
greater capacity for a debate on the facts). Still clearer defaults, if they
take place, would be preferable.
Question 4: (To the panel)
What remedies (such as attachments, injunctions and so forth)
are available to creditors of the Colno Group in your respective jurisdictions to conserve the defendants' assets pending a judgment?
Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
One possibility in England is to seek a "Mareva injunction" (a
form of order not available in the U.S.). The English courts will in
certain circumstances freeze the assets of a defendant who would
otherwise move or dissipate them to frustrate the effect of any judgment. The Mareva has been termed the "nuclear weapon" in the litigator's arsenal and accordingly will only be used sparingly.
The application for a Mareva injunction is usually made ex parte
(i.e. without the other party being present) and on affidavit. The plaintiff will have to establish: (i) a substantial cause of action falling
within the jurisdiction of the English court and a good arguable case;
(ii) that the defendant has assets within, and (where an extra-territorial order is sought) without, the jurisdiction; and (iii) evidence of
likely dissipation of those assets by the defendant. This third element
presents a relatively high threshold to any applicant.
The injunction itself will only be as effective as the third parties
who handle or have control over the defendant's assets (for example
the banks) are responsive. This means they must be given notice of
the injunction before the defendant is able to give instructions to
move or dispose of the assets.
[The insolvency of multi-national companies with assets and creditors in different jurisdictions can give rise to particular difficulties. In
Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company v. United States Lines Inc. 2
W.L.R. 109 (1989) the English court upheld a Mareva injunction
preventing a U.S. corporation (in Chapter 11) from removing its assets from England. This was done even though the English based creditors did not have secured claims. The decision was based on balancing
the competing interests of the parties. It should be noted, however,
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that the order merely froze the assets in England for a reasonable
period during which a winding-up could be commenced. It did not
give the English creditors a better right than other unsecured
creditors.]
Answer: (Mr. Heather)
If the Colmo America Group creditors hold negotiable instruments (promissory note, letter of credit, etc.) issued or guaranteed by
the Colmo Group, under Mexican law an executive action may be
brought before the Mexican courts, which action will confer on creditors the right to perform a pre-judgment attachment of the assets or
properties of the Colmo Group in Mexico, in order to secure creditors' rights until a valid final resolution is awarded to the creditors by
the Mexican court.
Such action would be subject to any prior bankruptcy or suspension of payments procedure initiated by the Colmo Group.
In addition, please be advised that under Mexican Law there are
several remedies against judicial orders as well as attachment prior to
judgment and in aid of execution.
Answer: (Ambassador Cardenas)
Attachments can be obtained.
Question 5: (To the panel)
What substantive defenses might the Colmo defendants be expected to raise in resisting enforcement of these debt obligations?
Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
Colmo foreshadows an argument based on force majeure. If
sound, this argument excuses the contracting parties from further performance. It is highly unlikely, however, that any material adverse
change or deterioration in a company's financial position would be
found at trial to amount to a force majeure. If reference to force
majeure in loan documentation is unqualified or undefined, and this is
unusual, English courts are prone to demand that the performance of
the relevant obligation was actually prevented and not merely hindered or made more onerous by the relevant event.
Similarly, any argument that the agreement to pay has been frustrated because of a change in financial conditions is unlikely to find
favor.
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Case law has established that the frustration of a contract takes
place when there supervenes an event "which so significantly changes
the nature (not merely the expense or onerousness) of the outstanding
contractual rights and/or obligations from what the parties could reasonably have contemplated.. .that it would be unjust to hold them to
the literal sense of its stipulations in the new circumstances.

.

." (Na-

tional CarriersLtd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. (1981 C.A. 675)).
That said, speculative arguments raised by the defendants at the
summary judgment stage, even though subsequently proved flawed at
trial, may nonetheless defeat the application (see question 1, above).
Answer: (Mr. Farah)
Under Mexican law a currency devaluation is not considered an
act of God or force majeure. Therefore, to the extent an action is
brought before the Mexican courts, the Colmo defendants may only
bring procedural exceptions, such as lack of notification or personality, payment, inconvenient forum, etc., as the case may be.
Answer: (Ambassador Cardenas)
Should the debtor, because of the devaluation, invoke force
majeure, such defense will probably not be accepted by Argentine
courts.

Question 6: (To Messrs. Newcomb and Barnard)
In light of the CFO's press release, the Colmo U.K. bonds and
interests in the Colmo America loan facility may be purchased in the
secondary market at 50% of their face value. An investor, Mr. Dred
Raptor, has acquired some of the bonds and an interest in the loan at
that price. In your view, does the fact of a discounted purchase of
these debts affect Mr. Raptor's entitlement to enforce his claims in the
courts of New York or England against the respective obligors for all
overdue amounts?
Is your answer to this question affected in any way by whether all
(or most) of the other creditors have agreed to restructure their
credits?
Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
The fact that Raptor bought the bonds at a discounted price will
not affect his rights to enforce his claims in England. He would be
suing for the payment of a debt, not damages. The price he paid for
the bonds is therefore immaterial.
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The position may be different, however, had Raptor bought the
bonds after a judgment had been given on the debt. This raises a
question as to whether or not trading a judgment debt is a violation of
process and can be challenged as "savouring of maintenance or
champerty."
As a matter of public policy, English courts treat as illegal any
agreement by a third party (with no legitimate interest in the litigation) to fund, assist or encourage disputes between parties. Such
"wanton and officious intermeddling" is known as "maintenance."
Champerty is a particular kind of maintenance: the maintenance of an
action in consideration of a promise to give the maintainer a share in
the proceeds or subject matter of the action.
Public policy objections (and by implication the doctrine of champerty) led the English Court of Appeal in Re ParisSkating Rink Co. (5
Ch. D. 959 (1877)) to hold that the assignment of a debt due from a
company coupled with the right to proceed in a winding-up already
commenced by the assignor was void. There is clearly an argument
that trading in debt after a judgment has been given is similarly
objectionable.
Neither is Raptor's entitlement to enforce affected if all (or even
most) of the other creditors have agreed to restructure their credits.
Creditors' rights can be compromised in three ways:
(i) with the consent of the creditor;
(ii) without the consent of the creditor in circumstances where
the majority of creditors have a contractual or statutory right to commit the minority to a particular course;
(iii) under relevant insolvency legislation where a particular proposal may be endorsed by the court or a duly appointed
representative.
Unless any of these situations applies, Raptor's rights will be unaffected. We must question, however, the wisdom of him pursuing
alone.
Bankruptcy
Question 7: (to Messrs. Cardenas, Mendes and Heather)
If the laws of El Paraiso resemble the laws of your respective
countries, is there any point at which Colmo, S.A. would be forced to
initiate a bankruptcy proceeding for itself or its subsidiaries? Are
there any liabilities for the directors or officers of Colmo, S.A. if the
company fails to do so?
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Answer: (Ambassador Cardenas)
When Colmo, S.A. reaches a point where it cannot pay its debts,
the respective Board of Directors must file for bankruptcy. A failure
to do so may entail the personal liability of directors and managers.
Answer: (Mr. Heather)
Under Mexican law, if Colmo, S.A. does not initiate the bankruptcy procedure within three days after it ceases the payment of its
obligations, the bankruptcy may be declared as guilty, in which case
the corresponding officers and directors of the company will have a
criminal and a civil liability for such bankruptcy.
Answer: (Mr. Mendes)
Pursuant to Brazilian law, declaration of bankruptcy is made by
the competent court upon request by a comerciante (businessman) or
by a creditor. The competent court is that of the judicial district
where the debtor has his principal place of business, or branch if the
debtor is headquartered outside Brazil.
Declaration of bankruptcy may also be requested by any creditor
whose liquid obligation has not been paid.
While the law imposes on the debtor the obligation to apply for
its own bankruptcy whenever it becomes insolvent, application for
bankruptcy by the debtor himself is a rare event. Debtors facing financial difficulties normally seek different alternatives, i.e., an out-ofcourt composition with creditors to avoid failure, or, if this is not feasible, they may seek protection through a court approved concordata.
A concordatais a privilege granted by law to comerciantes,pursuant to which a comerciante will be able to settle his obligations towards unsecured creditors on a time basis, by means of total or partial
payments as sanctioned by court. The purpose of law in granting the
debtor this privilege, to the detriment of creditors, is to avoid bankruptcy, which would be a greater hardship to creditors.
There are no liabilities for the directors or officers of Colmo, S.A.
if the company fails to apply for its bankruptcy, but such failure may
prevent Colmo, S.A. from applying for the benefit of a concordata.
In practice, before allowing creditors to apply for the company's
bankruptcy, or before forfeiting the right to apply for a concordata,
debtors in financial difficulties most times seek the benefit of a
concordata.
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Question 8: (To Mr. Greenblatt)
You represent Bigbank, the agent under the revolving loan to
Colmo America. In the face of this situation, does the prospect of a
bankruptcy proceeding in El Paraiso involving Colmo, S.A. worry
you?
Under what circumstances, if any, could orders originating from a
bankruptcy tribunal in El Paraiso interfere with the enforcement of
your client's rights as a creditor of Colmo's subsidiary in the United
States?
Answer: (Mr. Greenblatt)
This question raises legal and practical considerations. First, the
legal considerations.
A preliminary question is: does the bankruptcy tribunal in El
Paraiso have the authority to issue orders enjoining my client from
taking action against the assets of the debtor (Colmo, S.A.)? Recall,
the debtor in the El Paraiso proceedings is the guarantor of the debt
owed to my client. Therefore, my concern about the El Paraiso proceeding is not limited to the enforcement of my client's rights against
the U.S. subsidiary. It also relates to my client's rights against the El
Paraiso guarantor.
Assuming the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the
next question is: does the tribunal have authority to issue orders enjoining my client from taking action against the assets not of the
debtor, but of its U.S. subsidiary? Although I am not familiar with the
laws of El Paraiso, I would expect the answer to that question to be in
the negative. Unless there is a reason to pierce the corporate veils of
the parent and subsidiary corporations, the bankruptcy of the parent
should not result in the entry of orders having an effect upon the subsidiary - even a wholly owned subsidiary. There would also be a question as to whether the El Paraiso tribunal would have jurisdiction over
the U.S. subsidiary enabling it to enter orders with respect to the U.S.
corporation.
Finally, assuming the El Paraiso tribunal does have the authority
to enter orders enjoining actions against the assets of Colmo S.A.'s
U.S. subsidiary, there is the practical question of whether my client
has any reason to fear the violation of such an order. Do the El
Paraiso tribunal's orders purport to have worldwide effect? Would
they be recognized by a U.S. court? And, does my client do business
in El Paraiso such that it should be concerned about the possible
ramifications of violating the tribunal's orders?
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In sum, although I would wish to investigate the legal and practical questions raised by the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding of Colmo, S.A. in El Paraiso, the prospects of such a proceeding
may not have a great impact on my client's ability to receive payment
from its borrower, Colmo, S.A.'s U.S. subsidiary.
Question 9: (to Messrs. Cardenas, Mendes and Heather)
If the laws of El Paraiso resemble the laws of your respective
countries,
(i) At what point could Colmo, S.A. voluntarily seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws in your country?
(ii) Could such a proceeding seek a "reorganization" of the company, or must it involve a liquidation of the company?
(iii) Is there any basis in your law for involving Colmo America
or Colmo U.K. in a bankruptcy proceeding of the parent in El
Paraiso?
Answer: (Ambassador Cardenas)
Under Argentine law, reorganizations are possible. Should the
respective debtor proposal to the creditors be accepted, liquidation
can be avoided.
Answer: (Mr. Mendes)
(i) Under applicable law, the debtor that, without reason, does
not pay at maturity a liquid obligation must, within 30 days, petition
the court for the declaration of his own bankruptcy, stating cause for
his failure, the state of his business affairs, and supplying to the court
the required documentation, which includes a current balance-sheet
and the list of creditors with their respective credits.
(ii) Most times, rather than applying for bankruptcy, the debtor
company will apply for a concordata, which is a privilege granted by
law to comerciantes, pursuant to which a comerciante will be able to

settle his obligations towards unsecured creditors on a time basis, by
means of total or partial payments as sanctioned by court.
In the case of a preventive concordata,the debtor must offer the
payment to the creditors:
(a) of 50% of the total debt, if payment is to be made at
sight; or
(b) of 60%, 75%, 90% or 100% of the debt if payment is to
made within six, twelve, eighteen or twenty four months respec-
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tively. In the latter two instances, at least 2/5 of the amount owed
must be paid during the first year.
(iii) Given the fact that Colmo America and Colmo U.K. are
subsidiaries of Colmo, S.A., and as such totally independent companies, they will not be directly affected by the bankruptcy or concordata
of Colno, S.A.
There will certainly be indirect effects on both subsidiaries, as
suppliers and other creditors will, most likely, cease to provide credit
facilities to them.
Cross-default provisions may also be triggered, permitting creditors of the subsidiaries to accelerate their respective credits.
Another effect is that the shares of Colmo, S.A. in its subsidiaries,
Colmo America and Colmo U.K., may have to be sold, or else these
subsidiaries may have to be liquidated, in order to provide to Colmo,
S.A. funds with which to satisfy its own obligations.
Answer: (Mr. Heather)
(i) Under Mexican law, whenever a person ceases the payment
of its obligations, a bankruptcy procedure may be initiated. Such procedure may be initiated by law, by a voluntary petition of the corresponding person or its creditors. Therefore, if Colmo, S.A. ceases the
payment of its obligations, it may voluntarily request the authorities to
begin a bankruptcy procedure.
(ii) Under Mexican law, a person has the right to be placed in a
suspension of payments before being declared bankrupt. The goal of
the debtor is to restructure its debts with its creditors through the
assistance of the Court, in order to avoid bankruptcy. Under a suspension of payments, the court allows the debtor to continue its business and retain possession of its assets. Nevertheless, such procedure
may not be considered as a reorganization procedure of the company.
(iii) Both subsidiaries are part of the assets of Colmo, S.A.
Therefore, any resolution or procedure affecting Colmo, S.A., shall
involve both subsidiaries.
Question 10: (to Mr. Barnard)
Is there any basis under the laws of England for commencing an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the parent company,
Colmo, S.A. in England?
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Answer: (Mr. Barnard)
In theory the English court does have a wide jurisdiction (in effect a discretion) to wind-up overseas companies. It is permitted to
wind-up unregistered (including overseas) companies by, inter alia,
Section 220 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Specifically that act provides
that an unregistered company may be wound-up if it is unable to pay
its debts (Section 221 (5)). The court must be satisfied that the "inherent requirements of jurisdiction" (in addition to statutory requirements) are met before making a winding-up order in respect of a
foreign company. The petitioner will therefore have to demonstrate a
proper connection with the jurisdiction (e.g., by establishing that the
company has some asset or assets within the jurisdiction and that
there are one or more persons concerned in the proper distribution of
the assets over whom the jurisdiction is exercisable. See Megarry J. in
Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. Ch. 75 (1973).).
As a practical matter, however, petitioning for the winding-up of
Colmo, S.A., is unlikely to be advisable on our facts. The only apparent asset in England is the shareholding in the U.K. subsidiary. Any
action in England is almost certainly best directed at that company.
Question 11: (To Mr. Greenblatt)
Do you see any advantages to commencing a preemptive bankruptcy proceeding against Colmo America in the United States in
these circumstances? Is there any basis in U.S. law for seeking an involuntary bankruptcy of the parent, Colmo, S.A., in a U.S. bankruptcy
court?
Answer: (Mr. Greenblatt)
First, I do not see any great advantages to commencing a preemptive bankruptcy proceeding against Colmo America. Unless other
creditors are in the process of seizing assets of Colmo America, or
Colmo America is fraudulently conveying assets or making preferential transfers to creditors, or the management of Colmo America is
dishonest or inept, a bankruptcy proceeding is not likely to assist in
curing the problems that led to Colmo America's difficulty in making
the payments owed to my client. Indeed, aside from being costly, a
bankruptcy proceeding may complicate my client's ability to negotiate
a resolution with its borrower, because the bankruptcy process is open
to all creditors (including the bondholders) and anything agreed upon
by my client and Colmo America will require bankruptcy court approval upon notice to all parties in interest. For these reasons, I would
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be reluctant to commence a bankruptcy proceeding against Colmo
America.
Moreover, the decision to commence an involuntary proceeding
must be carefully taken. Such a proceeding must be filed by three or
more entities, each of which is the holder of a claim that is not the
subject of a bona fide dispute. For relief to be entered against the
debtor in an involuntary case the court must find that the debtor is
generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 156, the filing of such a petition is a criminal
offense if the bankruptcy case is dismissed because of a knowing attempt by a bankruptcy petition preparer in any manner to disregard
the requirements of Title 11, United States Code. For these reasons,
an involuntary bankruptcy case should not be filed unless the preparer
of the petition is comfortable that the requirements for the filing of
such a petition are met.
With respect to the question of whether there is a legal basis to
fie an involuntary bankruptcy case in the United States against
Colmo, S.A., assuming the requirements discussed above can be met,
there is the question of whether Colmo, S.A., can be a debtor under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. 109 provides that only a person
that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the
United States may be a debtor. Thus, a foreign entity may be a debtor
in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, but only if it meets these requirements. It appears that Colmo, S.A., does not have a domicile or place
of business in the United States. The only open question is whether it
has property in the United States. If it does, and if the other requirements of 11 U.S.C. 109 are met, there may be a legal basis (putting
aside whether there is a good strategic basis) for seeking an involuntary bankruptcy of Colmo, S.A., in the United States.
Question 12: (to Messrs. Cardenas, Mendes and Heather)
Assuming again that the laws of El Paraiso resemble the laws of
your respective countries, in a bankruptcy of Colmo, S.A.,
(i) Would foreign creditors suffer any disadvantage or
discrimination?
(ii) What claims, if any, against Colmo, S.A. would be entitled to
a priority or privilege in such a bankruptcy?
(iii) Would certain obligations (such as intra-group debt) be
subordinated to the claims of third-party creditors?
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(iv) At what point, if at all, would the claims of foreign creditors
be converted into their local currency equivalent for purposes of participating in a bankruptcy proceeding in your country?
Answers to 12 (Mr. Mendes)
(i) Foreign creditors do not suffer any disadvantage or discrimination in relation to local creditors, except for the effects of the conversion of their creditors from foreign currency into local currency, which
will be discussed in response to sub-question iv.
(ii) The order of classification of credits in the bankruptcy of a
Brazilian company is as follows:
(a) credits relating to indemnification for on-the-job
accidents;
(b) credits relating to obligations under labor law;
(c) fiscal and para-fiscal credits held by federal, state and
municipal agencies. Social security contributions are at the same
rank with federal taxes;
(d) the disbursements and expenses incurred by the bankruptcy estate, namely:
(1) court costs pertaining to bankruptcy proceedings and
respective motions and appeals, and court costs pertaining to
lawsuits in which the bankruptcy estate is defeated;
(2) loans made to bankruptcy estate by the sindico or
other creditors;
(3) expenses incurred with attachment, seizure, appraisal, maintenance, administration and sale of the assets,
the sindico's fee inclusive;
(4) expenses pertaining to illness and funeral of the
bankrupt comerciante who dies in poverty in the course of
bankruptcy proceedings;
(5) taxes which fall due during the processing of
bankruptcy;
(6) indemnification for on-the-job accidents which occur
in the course of proceedings in the event the bankrupt continues to operate its business;
(7) court costs paid by the creditor which filed the request for bankruptcy; and
(8) obligations resulting from valid commitments undertaken by the sindico.
(e) claims secured by guarantees in rem;
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(f) credits that have a special privilege on certain assets;
these are determined by applicable law, such as the credit for
rental payments in the real estate where the bankrupt used to
carry on its business;
(g) credits with a general privilege, also determined by applicable law, such as credits due retirement and pension plans;
(iii) Intra-group credits, provided that they represent legitimate
obligations, are treated like any other credit and will not be
subordinated to third-party creditors.
(iv) All credits denominated in foreign currency shall be converted into local currency at the exchange rate prevailing in Brazil on
the date of declaration of bankruptcy, and the amount so determined
shall be the amount to be considered for all purposes of the Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law.
The same applies for unsecured foreign creditors in the case of
concordataproceedings.
Answer: (Mr. Heather)
(i) Under Mexican law, foreign creditors will have the same rights
and obligations as any national creditor.
(ii) Creditors' rights will be subject to the priorities granted by
Mexican law to fiscal and labor claims, as well as to the bankruptcy or
suspension of payment procedure expenses.
(iii) No, under Mexican law that criteria is not considered in order to rank creditors claims. Intra-group debt will be considered as a
third-party creditor.
(iv) In bankruptcy and suspension of payment procedures, debts
are accelerated and interest stops accruing with the declaration.
Therefore, the Mexican courts will consider foreign currency debts accelerated, and will convert such debt into Mexican currency at the exchange rate effective on the date the bankruptcy or suspension of
payments is declared.
Such criteria is based on judicial precedents which we do not
agree with since the Mexican Monetary Law (the Monetary Law) provides that in the event that proceedings are brought in Mexico seeking
performance of payment obligations in Mexico, the party owing
amounts may discharge its obligations by paying any sums due in a
currency other than Mexican currency, in Mexican currency at the rate
of exchange prevailing in Mexico on the date when payment was
made.
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Nevertheless, the Mexican courts have applied the acceleration of
debt criteria instead of applying the provision of the Monetary Law.
Answer: (Ambassador Cardenas)
See above, answer to question #2.
ENFORCEMENT
Question 13: (To Messrs. Cardenas, Mendes and Heather)
The Colmo U.K. bondholders have sued and obtained a judgment against Colmo U.K. and Colmo, S.A. in the High Court of Justice in London.
Under what circumstances would such a judgment be enforced in
your country?
Answer: (Mr. Mendes)
Given the fact that Colmo, S.A. and Colmo U.K. are independent
companies, a judgment against Colno U.K. would have no effect
whatsoever vis-a-vis Colmo, S.A., unless Colmo, S.A. were to be a
guarantor of the obligations of Colmo U.K.
In the latter case a foreign judgment against Colmo, S.A. itself
(but not against Colmo U.K. only) could be enforced in Brazil.
The requirements for enforcement of foreign judgments in Brazil
are discussed below:
Any judgment rendered by a competent foreign court against a
Brazilian company would be recognized and enforced by the
courts of Brazil without re-examination of the issues, provided
that: (i) such judgment is obtained in compliance with the legal
requirements of the jurisdiction of the court rendering such judgment; (ii) such judgment is for the payment of a certain amount
of money; (iii) service of process in the relevant action was made
personally on the Brazilian defendant, either through a properly
appointed agent for service of process domiciled abroad, or, if
made directly against the defendant in Brazil, in compliance with
applicable requirements of Brazilian law; (iv) such judgment does
not contravene Brazilian public policy; (v) such judgment is final
in the jurisdiction where rendered; and (vi) the applicable procedure under the law of Brazil with respect to the enforcement of
foreign judgment is complied with.
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Answer. (Mr. Heather)
A valid final award rendered by the competent foreign board
(court of arbitration), would be enforced by the courts of Mexico
without a retrial on the merits provided:
(a) such award is obtained in compliance with the legal requirements of the jurisdiction of the board rendering such award;
(b) such award is rendered in an in personam action as opposed
to an in rem action;
(c) process in the action has been served personally to the defendant or a duly appointed agent;
(d) the obligation for which enforcement is sought does not violate Mexican law or public policy (orden publico);
(e) a rogatory letter from the arbitration board that rendered the
award is available to the Mexican court before which enforcement of
the award is requested, which rogatory letter complies with the procedural formalities provided for under Mexican law and a Spanish translation of the documents required in such proceedings prepared by a
court-approved translator would have to be approved by the court after the defendant had been given the opportunity to be heard with
respect to the accuracy of the translation, and proceedings would
thereafter be based upon the translated documents;
(f) such award is final in the jurisdiction where obtained;
(g) the action in respect of which such award is rendered is not
the subject matter of a lawsuit among the same parties pending before
a Mexican court;
(h) the courts of such jurisdiction recognize the principles of reciprocity in connection with the enforcement of Mexican awards in such
jurisdiction; and
(i) the requirements to establish the authenticity of the documents evidencing the final award must be met.
Answer. (Ambassador Cardenas)
Should no bankruptcy procedures be started against Colmo, S.A.,
a foreign judgment against such company, as guarantor for the U.K.
bondholders can be enforced under "executor" procedures.

